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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY, INC.
A Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
:
:

Vs.

:

STEVEN L. KEIL, and
BRODY CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC.
A Utah Corporation,

:Appellate No. 20000468-SC
:
Priority: 15

Defendants/Appellants

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a direct appeal from a decision by Judge Rodney S. Page of the
Second Judicial District Court, sitting with a jury, in which judgment was
entered jointly and severely against the Defendants in the amount of
$188,675.00. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to §78-22(3)(j) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). Priority is 15.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the

Defendants misappropriated Plaintiffs prices? The Standard of Review in
reviewing any jury award of damages is whether there is a sufficient basis for
the reviewing court to determine that there is a rational legal basis and a
sufficient factual basis for the decision. Sampson vs. Richins, 770 P. 2d 998
(Utah App 1989).
This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (R. 1988) and supporting memorandum
(R. 1994) and Motion for New Trial or Amendment of Verdict (R. 1986) and
the supporting memorandum (R. 1994).
2.

Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the

Defendants interfered with prospective economic relationships of Plaintiff
with Alliant Tech, Mag Corp, and Cargill? The Standard of Review is the
same as set forth under issue number 1 above.

2

This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (R. 1988) and supporting memorandum
(R. 1994) and Motion for New Trial or Amendment of Verdict (R. 1986) and
the supporting memorandum (R. 1994).
3.

Did the delivery by Defendant Steven L. Keil of letters to Alliant Tech,

Mag Corp. or Cargil constitute, as a matter of law, a misappropriation of trade
secrets? The Standard of Review is for correctness and abuse of discretion.
Drake vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 939 P. 2d 177 (Utah 1997)
This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment (R. 1422 and 1670) and the supporting memorandums (R.
1423, 1672 and 1810).
4.

Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to grant Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment prior to the trial with respect to the issue of the
misappropriation of pricing? The Standard of Review is for correctness.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.. vs. Garfield County. 811 P. 2d
184 (Utah 1991).
This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment (R. 1422 and 1670) and the supporting memorandums (R.
1423, 1672 and 1810).
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5.

Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to grant Defendants' Motion for

a Directed Verdict following the presentation of the Plaintiffs case? The
Standard of Review is that the evidence must be reviewed in the light most
favorable to the losing party under the Motion and the Reviewing Court must
determine that there was a reasonable basis to conclude that the losing party
could prevail. Management Committee of Grey Stone Pines Homeowners
Association vs. Grey Stone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982 ).
This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motion for
Directed Verdict. (R. 1992.)
6.

Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to grant Defendants' Motion for

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or Motion for New Trial or
Amendment of the Verdict, following the trial. The Standard of Review is
whether or not the Court was arbitrary and abused its discretion. Smith vs.
Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976)
This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (R. 1988) and supporting memorandum
(R. 1994) and Motion for New Trial or Amendment of Verdict (R. 1986) and
the supporting memorandum (R. 1994).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This an appeal from a jury verdict granting judgment for Plaintiff
against the Defendants in a misappropriation of trade secrets case. The genesis
of this appeal came from an initial ruling by this Court from an Interlocutory
Appeal filed by the Defendant Keil in Water & Energy Systems Technology,
Inc., vs. Steven L. Keil 974 P. 2d 821 (Utah 1999). The Court, after reviewing
the District Court's granting of a Preliminary Injunction in favor of the
Plaintiff, reviewed Judge Page's findings and unanimously reversed his
decision and ruled that Plaintiff had not met the required evidentiary burden of
demonstrating that either its chemical formulas or pricing had been
misappropriated by the Defendant Keil either under tort law principles or the
Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act. §13-24-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended) (see Addendum A). Following that ruling, Defendants moved for
Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff on all issues. (R. 1422) The Court
granted Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of misappropriation of
chemical formula but failed to grant Summary Judgment on the issues of
misappropriation of the Plaintiffs price list, interference with economic
relationships and violation of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act.

c

Following further discovery, Defendants filed a second Motion for
Summary Judgment(R. 1670) which was denied by the Court on November 15,
1999. (R. 1841)
Jury trial commenced on February 23, 2000. At the conclusion of
Plaintiffs case, Defendants moved for a Directed Verdict pursuant to Rule 58
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court denied that Motion and the
jury then found in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants pursuant to
a special interrogatory verdict (see Addendum B) and entered Judgment,
jointly and severally, against Defendants for $188,675.00.
Following the verdict, the Defendants filed Motions for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New Trial and Amendment of Verdict
which were denied on May 31, 2000. Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed
on June 1,2000.
FACTS
The following factual presentation represents a marshalling of the
evidence presented both by Plaintiff and Defendants during the proceedings in
the Trial Court. For ease of reference, the Plaintiff, Water and Energy Systems
Technology Inc, will be referenced through the remainder of this Brief as
WEST, the Defendant Steven L. Keil, as Keil and the Defendant Brody
Chemical Co. Inc. as Brody. References to the pleadings in the record on
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appeal will be prefaced by the letter R and the pleading itself. References to
the Trial Transcript will be identified by the letters Tp followed by the page
number of the transcript. The exhibits which were offered in the trial are
referred to by the exhibit number. Other major documents will be supplied in
the Addendum.
L

WEST and Brody are companies operating in the State of Utah who

develop, market and distribute water treatment chemicals and services to the
general public. (Tp. 4 and 318]
2.

Keil began employment with WEST as a water treatment chemical

salesman in 1986. At the time of his employment Keil held a bachelors degree
in Physics and Math and a Masters Degree in Chemical Engineering with a
Minor in Chemistry. [Tp. 10-11]
3.

Although Keil had previously worked for Dow Chemical Company, he

did not specifically work in water treatment and had no training whatsoever in
the areas of boiler and cooling tower treatment. [Tp. 11]
4.

At no time did Keil sign an agreement stating that if he terminated his

employment with WEST he would not go to work with any of WEST'S
competitors and no other non-competition restriction existed contractually
between WEST and Keil [Tp. 107]

5.

While employed by WEST, the majority of Keil's income was derived

from sales to the following customers: Hill Air Force Base, Alliant Tech,
Laidlaw, Mag Corp, Utah State University, EG & G and Cargill Flour. [Tp.
12-13]
6.

Franklin M. Leaver Jr. was the President of WEST during the entire

period of Keil's employment. [Tp 4]
7.

Mr. Leaver and Keil testified that the process by which Keil obtained

customers was that he would use bid sheets and prospect lists that were given
to him by WEST. Keil would then contact potential customers and develop a
price and product proposal for each specific customer. [Tp 11 and 309-310]
Keil did not specifically create the prices but talked with the potential
customers and returned to the WEST office for suggestions as to what prices
ought to be charged. Mr. Leaver would then review the assessment and
evaluate and modify it as he saw fit. [Tp78 and 309-310]

Keil was also told

by Mr. Leaver that the prices being developed for WEST'S products and
services were to be confidential. There were no price lists published by WEST
but each customer had specific prices that were individualized for them. No
comprehensive price list was ever issued by WEST . [Tp 9-10]
8.

When Keil made a proposal to a new customer that had been approved

by WEST, letters were normally presented signed by Keil indicating pricing on

a per pound basis with the disclosure of composition concentration and that the
material was proprietary and confidential and the prospective customer was to
maintain it as such. [Tp 10]
9.

During his twelve (12) years with WEST, Keil was successful in

increasing WESTs business. In particular, he fostered good working
relationships with customers known as Cargill, Alliant Tech and Mag Corp.,
Utah State University, Hill Air Force Base, Union Pacific, EG&G and Laidlaw. [Tp.12-13]
10.

WEST had long term agreements with Cargill, Mag Corp and Alliant

Tech to purchase various products at certain prices, although these agreements
were not exclusive and the customers were free to purchase product from other
suppliers and to terminate the agreement at any time. [Tp. 71-72]
11.

Keil was compensated by WEST using a base salary with commissions

and received an automobile allowance. [Tp 11-12]
12.

In the summer of 1997, WEST began experiencing problems with the

Mag Corp account in that the company questioned WEST'S ability to service its
boiler and ultimately bought products from another company. Keil was in
charge of the Mag Corp account during this period. [Tp .18]
13.

Shortly thereafter, James Wilson, an employee with Brody for 2 1/2

years met Keil and discussed with him the concept of coming to work for

o

Brody. Sometime in October of 1997, Keil met Jon Liddiard, the President of
Brody, and continued discussions about coming to work for Brody. [Tpl37138]
14.

Wilson testified that an understanding was reached between Keil and

Brody sometime between October and November of 1997, that Keil would
leave WEST and associate himself with Brody, however, no firm agreement
was reached because Keil needed more time to determine that he could provide
similar products at competitive pricing for Brody that he had with WEST. [Tp
139]
15.

During this period, Keil contacted Buckman Laboratories and ultimately

satisfied himself that he could compete at Brody and determined to leave
WEST. [Tp 49-50] During this same period, another employee of WEST,
Greg Offerman, also expressed interest in leaving WEST and going with Brody
and met with Keil and representatives of Brody on a number of occasions to
discuss future employment. [Tp. 224-228]
16.

On March 2, 1998, Keil and Offerman informed Mr. Leaver for the first

time that they were considering employment with Brody. At the time of that
discussion, Mr. Leaver had no idea the two men had been talking to Brody.
He asked both men to give him at least two weeks notice and Offerman agreed.
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The following evening, March 3 rd , Keil informed Mr. Leaver that March 2nd
was his last day and that he would not return. [Tp 27]
17.

Immediately after March 2, 1998, Keil sent letters to six major

customers of WEST telling them that he was leaving WEST and that he could
provide the same quality of service and product as a representative of Brody
with a 10% reduction in price. Keil prepared these letters on Brody's stationery
on his own computer. One of the letters was dated February 18th but was not
sent at that time. All of the letters were hand-delivered by Keil to the specific
customers including Alliant Tech, Mag Corp, and Cargill on or about March
10th or 11, 1998. [Tp. 348-352] Keil prepared these letters and made the
proposals based upon knowledge he gained during the time he worked with
WEST. Keil took no documents with him that set forth pricing but had the
knowledge of the prices that were developed by Mr. Leaver and him while Keil
was employed by WEST. [Tp. 350-351] (See Addendum C)
18.

Following Keil's leaving WEST, WEST sent a certified letter requiring

that Keil return to WEST various proprietary items that he had in his
possession. [Tp 29]
19.

Mr. Leaver testified that a pager was returned in approximately a week

to ten days. [Tp 29] Keys were not returned for some time, nor was a Hill Air
Force Base key and customer files. Ultimately some customer files were

partially returned although they had no correspondence or service reports in
them between February of 1996 though March of 1998. [Tp. 29-32] Two price
sheets were returned, but all other price sheets that WEST claimed Keil
received and were in his possession were not returned. [Tp 32] Mr. Leaver
testified that there was still some missing inventory including pricing sheets for
Alliant Tech and Mag Corp as of the date of the Trial, March 2, 2000. [Tp32]
20.

On March 16, 1998, WEST received a letter from Mag Corp stating that

"after reviewing recent developments including problems with WEST'S
representative (Keil)" it decided to select another supplier.(Tp 39-40]
21.

During the trial, representatives of each of the three companies that

WEST used to establish damages, Cargill, Mag Corp and Alliant Tech, testified
that they already knew their prices and that Keil only disclosed his knowledge
of their prices to each of them individually and did not disclose their prices to
other competitors. [Tp. 166-184-205] Mr. Leaver also testified that there was
no evidence that Keil gave the prices Alliant Tech was paying for a particular
product to Mag Corp or to Cargill or visa versa. He also testified that he had
no contract with the particular parties binding them to purchase only from
WEST. If they got a better price from someone else, there was nothing to
prohibit them from buying the product if they felt it would do the job at a better
price. [Tp70-72] Specifically, each of the representatives of Mag Corp, Allaint

Tech and Cargill testified that pricing was not the key issue in determining
whether or not they accepted a particular proposal for water treatment products
but that a) quality of service and b) the reputation of the service technician
were most important. [Tp. 168-69, 186-87, 215-216 ]
22.

The President of WEST California, Brent W.Chettell, also testified that

price was not the most important factor in determining the selection of a water
chemical treatment supplier and that other considerations such as service,
technician, and quality of product were of primary importance. [Tp. 267]
23.

None of the representatives of Cargill, Alliant Tech or Mag Corp

testified that they either stopped utilizing WEST or utilized Brody on the basis
of price.[Tp. 168-70, 186-90,215-218]
24.

Although Mr. Leaver continued to assert that the letters sent out by Keil

were inappropriate, he testified that the disclosure by Keil in the letters of the
prices to the individual companies was not a violation of something he believed
was proprietary and that the offending portion of the document (letters) was a
statement that Brody could provide the same or similar products and that
nothing else violated any of WEST'S proprietary interests. [Tp 115-116]
25.

In one instance, Kathy Vigil of Alliant Tech testified that when Mr.

Leaver and an associate approached her, after Keil had left WEST and began
working with Brody, their rudeness and inappropriate behavior caused her to
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determined that Alliant Tech would no longer do business with WEST. [Tp.
205-208]
26.

Keith Rydalch of Mag Corp testified that he sent a letter dated March

16 to WEST indicating that "after reviewing recent developments including
problems with WEST'S representative (Keil)" they decided to select another
supplier. Rydalch further testified that he thought Keilfs behavior with respect
to leaving WEST and sending out the letter the day after his termination was
inappropriate. [Tp. 67-68]
27.

Mr. Leaver testified, based upon WEST'S prior history of sales to Alliant

Tech, Cargill and Mag Corp. respectively, that in February of 1998, he
received a two year purchase order from Alliant Tech and anticipated gross
sales for the two year period would have been $136,419.48 factoring in a gross
profit margin of 60% thus the damage to WEST because of Alliants failure to
continue purchasing products and services was $81,851.69. With respect to
Mag Corp, Mr. Leaver testified the total anticipated growth sales for two years
was $167,417.25 factoring a 63% profit margin resulting in damages of
$105,472.87. The projected loss for Cargill under the same theory was $6,
391.62. [Tp 71-73] (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 29)
The following facts relate specifically to the District Court proceedings
concerning various pre-trial, trial, and post-trial motions.

28.

Following this Court's ruling in Water Energy Systems Technology Inc.,

vs. Steven L. Keil Supra on February 19, 1999, the Defendants filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment claiming that the water treatment formulas and the
price list of the Plaintiff were not trade secrets and had not been
misappropriated by the Defendants. [See R. 1422]
29.

On July 28, 1999, the Trial Judge ruled "That while there is sufficient

evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude that the formula and
price list of Plaintiff were confidential and Defendant Keil was under an
expressed or implied contract which limited their disclosure. However, in
order for the Plaintiff to prevail on claim of misappropriation of Plaintiffs
formula, Plaintiff has to prove that the formulas were the same or that Brody's
formulas were specifically derived from those of the Plaintiff. No such
credible evidence has been provided either by testimony at the prior hearing
or by subsequent affidavit. For that reason, the Court grants Defendant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of the misappropriation of
the formulae. The Court further concludes that there remains a question of
fact as to the misappropriation of Plaintiffs price list, and as to whether the
Plaintiffs price lists were used by Defendant Keil and Brody in establishing
their own price lists." Based upon the foregoing, the Trial Court denied
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Addendum D.)

30.

The Defendants filed a second motion for Summary Judgment on

November 2, 1999. (R. 1670) The Court ruled that there were still contested
material issues of fact, but limited the WEST's damage claim to the following
customers: Mag Corp., EG&G, Union Pacific, Hill Air Force Base, Utah
State University, Cargill Hour, Laidlaw and Alliant Tech Systems. [See
Addendum E]
31.

After the conclusion of the Plaintiffs case, the Defendants moved for a

Directed Verdict, R.1992, relying heavily on the case of Microbiological
Research Corporation vs. Muna, 625 P. 2d 690 (Utah 1981). The Trial Court
ruled from the bench as follows: " The Court knows that

Defendants

primarily rely on the case (Muna) which was in 1991 case. That subsequent to
that time in 1989 Utah adopted the Utah Trade Secret Act and that induces
into the law new issues which in fact are before the Court in the matters which
have been filed." Judge Page then cited specific provisions of the Act and
ruled, with respect to the particular definitions of the Act, that there were still
issues to be determined and if the jury chose to believe everything that was
presented by way of the Plaintiffs case, they could find a misappropriation of
a trade secret. The question of damages was, still in fact, one for the jury.
32.

The Trial Court then looked at the intentional interference with

economic purpose and determined that under tort law WEST would have to

demonstrate that the Defendants' interference was maliciously motivated in
the sense of inspired desire to do harm to the Plaintiff for the Defendants' own
sake and that there has been no such showing. The only basis shown by
Plaintiff to demonstrate intentional interference was that there was a
misappropriation of a trade secret by Keil or Brody. The Trial Court also
eliminated for consideration by the jury any claim for damages except as to
Alliant Tech, Mag Corp, and Cargill. [Tp 292-293 Bench Ruling]
33.

Following the Trial, the Defendant's timely filed Motions for a New

Trial, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Amended Judgment. These
Motions were argued in a separate hearing on May 2, 2000. Unfortunately the
Clerk of the Court failed to put a video tape in the machine and the argument
was not recorded and, therefore, cannot be given to the Court.
34.

The Trial Court's findings with respect to Defendants' post-trial motions

were entered on May 31, 2000 and in particular stated:
1. The misappropriation of confidential information by Defendants took
place, not in the disclosure of Plaintiffs WEST pricing to its own
customers but rather in a disclosure of WEST pricing to Defendant
Brody Chemical, an entity separate from Defendant Keil, for the
purpose of Brody Chemical to compete with WEST.
2. By Defendant Keil giving that confidential information to Defendant
Brody Chemical, the trade secret was destroyed.

3. The pricing information provided to Defendant Brody Chemical did
not come from Palintiffs WEST's customers but rather directly from
Defendant Keil.
4. The damages awarded by the jury were fair and reasonable, and in
keeping with the evidence presented at trial.

5.

The case of Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,
304 (Utah 1982) is relevant as to setting the standards by which the
tort of interference with a business relationship is determined.
[Addendum F ]

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the
Defendants misappropriated WEST's prices, or that the Defendants interfered
with prospective economic relationships of WEST in that WEST's pricing was
not a Trade Secret and that, even if it was, Keil did not destroy the Trade
Secret because it was only disclosed to those who already knew the prices.
There is no nexus between the delivery by Keil of letters indicating price
reductions to Cargill, Mag Corp and Alliant Tech and any damage claimed by
WEST, in that none of these entities made decisions with respect to the
continuation of their relationships with WEST based upon pricing nor did
WEST have exclusive agreements that the companies buy only from them.
The Trial Court drove this case to its unjust conclusion by failing to
grant Defendants' motions prior to, during and post-trial in accordance with

the directives of this Court in its February 19, 1999, ruling on the Preliminary
Injunction.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE CUSTOMER PRICING DEVELOPED BY KEIL
WHILE AT WEST WAS NOT A TRADE SECRET AND
KEIL'S DELIVERY OF THOSE PRICES BY LETTER TO
THREE EXISTING WEST CUSTOMERS WAS NOT A
MISAPPROPRIATION OF A TRADE SECRET AND THE
EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL DID NOT PURPONDERATE
SUCH A FACTUAL FINDING AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRERD IN REFUSING TO DETERMINE THAT SUCH
WAS THE CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Keil and Brody did not misappropriate a Trade Secret of WEST. The
gravaman of this case lies in this Court's decision reversing the Trial Court's
entry of an Injunction against Keil at the initial stages of this litigation. In
that Interlocutory Appeal, while the focus of the Court was on whether or not
the Trial Court had properly issued an Injunction against Keil, the Court
recognized basic principles that should have been applied to this case by the
Trial Court during the entirety of the litigation. This Court recognized that the
leading case in this area is Microbiological Research Corp vs. Muna. Supra
which creates the standards for establishing a claim for the misappropriation
of Trade Secrets. Interestingly, the Trial Court in its denial of a Motion for
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denial of a Motion for Directed Verdict after the presentation of WEST's case
made a specific reference to the fact that, in effect, the Muna case was
trumped by the statutory provisions of the Utah Trade Secrets Act, Utah Code
Annotated §13-24-1 et seq. (1953, as amended)
What WEST never recognized and apparently neither did the Trial
Court, was that this Court was well aware of the existence of the above
referenced statute and did not in any way limit or distinguish Muna as the
leading case establishing the standards by which the existence or nonexistence of a Trade Secret would be determined in this state.
After this Court's February 19, 1999, decision, Keil and Brody filed the
first of a succession of motions to have the Trial Court terminate the litigation
on the basis that WEST had no claim, as a matter of law. In its ruling on
Defendant's first Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial Court correctly
concluded that WEST could not proceed on its claim that Keil had
misappropriated its chemical formulas, however, it left the pricing issue to be
determined at Trial. Following that ruling, the entire focus of the litigation
was on pricing.
It is important to note that no generalized lists showing the prices of
WEST'S products were ever provided in any of the pre-trial motions. In fact,
no price sheets were produced in the Trial by WEST. WEST'S position was

that they were taken away and not returned. Keil denied this, and testified that
all he took away was his knowledge of the prices. Tp. 350-351]
What is clear and unrefuted from all of the testimony at Trial was that
each of WEST'S client's prices were developed on an individual basis. The
common practice, according to Mr. Leaver, was that Keil would meet with the
prospective customer, review its water chemical treatment needs and return
and discuss the same with Mr. Leaver and others to determine appropriate
pricing for the services and products to be provided. Keil in fact testified that
he developed the bulk of the prices, but Mr. Leaver indicated that all prices
were subject to his final approval. [Tp. 391] At the time of Keil's termination,
Keil knew WEST'S prices not from a price list but from his direct contact with
the customer over twelve years. Each pricing scheme was individualized to
the particular customer and was known both to Keil and WEST and most
importantly to the each customer. WEST directed its customers to maintain
the integrity of the process by keeping the prices confidential from other
customers.
The evidentiary focus of the Trial concentrated on three specific WEST
customers identified as Cargill, Mag Corp and Alliant Tech. Representatives
of each of those entities, to wit: Keith Ridalch of Mag Corp, Rich Henderson
of Cargill and Kathleen Vigil of Alliant Tech, all testified that they knew the
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prices they paid for WEST'S products and that they did not know the pricing
that other customers paid for the same products. In their discussions, Keil
simply repeated back each customer's prices with a proposal for a 10%
reduction if they changed to Brody. Each customer was aware of what it paid
for WEST's products. There was no evidence produced at Trial showing that
Keil disclosed these prices to Brody and that Brody used them to compete
with WEST. The only evidence of any disclosure of WEST's pricing was the
three letters sent respectively to Cargill, Mag Corp and Alliant Tech.
(Addendum C)
These letters are self explanatory but simply demonstrate Keil's
knowledge of WEST's pricing and his ability to better WEST's pricing by
approximately 10%. There was also no evidence presented by any witness
that Keil disclosed WEST's pricing of products to Cargil to Alliant Tech, or
Mag Corp or visa versa or to any other party, including Brody. The only
disclosure presented to the jury was the information contained in the three
letters and the discussions Keil had with representatives of the three customers
about the pricing.
This becomes important when one examines the following specific
language of Muna:
A secret may not be in a public domain if extensive effort is
required to pierce its veil by assembling the literature concerning
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it and thereby uncover its parts. If this can be readily done by one
who is normally skilled in the field and has a reasonable
familiarity with its trade literature, the secret may no longer be
entitled to protection as such. An employer to obtain relief must
establish that his former employee's product (in this case the
pricing) is a copy of his own product, that its method or
production was secret, and that the former employee has used or
intends to use confidential information acquired during his
employment. Id at 696.... Upon termination of his employment,
an employee has the prerogative to use his general knowledge,
experience, memory and skill, however gained, provided he does
not use, disclose, or impinge upon any of the secret processes or
business secrets of his former employer. The distinction between
general and special knowledge can only be resolved by a
balancing of the conflicting social and economic interests of two
desirable goals.... Confidential information of the employer,
however, loses any protection to which it may have been entitled
after it had been merged into the employee's own faculties, skill
and experience. Since experience is something a man acquires, a
standard must be found to test whether, in a particular case, an
employee's experience is such as will permit of its use at the
termination of the employment, even though it may prove
detrimental to his former employer. Id. at 676 and 697.
A case involving the determination of whether a policyholder list was a
Trade Secret and could not therefore be used by an agent who left the
company and went to work for someone else. Harvest Life Ins Co vs. Getche
701 N.E. P. 2d 871 (Ind. App. 1998) In that case, the Court held that
the rationale which has been followed in these cases is that
the information could be obtained from the policyholder himself,
from the policy, or from other materials provided to the
policyholder by the insurance company. This Court observed
about College Life Insurance Company of America, in a footnote
in steenhoven, 460 N.E.2d at 975, what we observe today about
Harvest. Harvest seems to seek to prevent competition by its
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former agent more than it seeks to protect a trade secret.] Id. at
876
In this case, Keil cannot be expected to purge from his own knowledge
pricing for products which he himself developed for various customers of
WEST. The interesting dichotomy in this case is that had Keil never sent the
letters, but simply approached Alliant, Cargil and Mag Corp and gave them a
bid on behalf of Brody which he knew to be 10% under WEST because of the
general knowledge he took with him after leaving, Plaintiff would have had no
evidence of any purported Trade Secrets of misappropriation of claim secrets.
The fact is however, that the letters merely memorialize in written form what
Keil already knew in his mind and this conduct is not prohibited by the leading
case that this Court has accepted as a standard.
Unfortunately, however, the Trial Court determined that the prices were
Trade Secrets, and the jury also concluded as part of their verdict that the
pricing for various WEST products to various customers were trade secrets
within the context of the Utah Trade Secrets Act. There was substantial
evidence that these were not secrets to the extent that they were within the
general purview of Keil's knowledge. The representatives of the three
companies, as set forth above, testified that although they were told to protect
the integrity of the prices, a good salesman could find out what their prices
were either by simply asking them or by checking the general pricing rates
?4

commonly used in the area. It was, however, the position of WEST, through
Mr. Leaver, that the prices were proprietary and that Keil and customers were
told not to disclose them to others.
Notwithstanding the above, the critical issue is whether or not Keil's
sending of the letters to Cargil, Mag Corp and Alliant Tech constituted a
misappropriation of the Trade Secret. Here the evidence overwhelmingly
mandates that the jury's verdict was erroneous. What is more problematic is
that the Trial Court announced for the first time in its ruling on Defendants'
post-trial motions, that the misappropriation was Keil's delivery of pricing
information to Brody.
The Trial Court ruled that Keil's informing Brody of his knowledge of
WEST'S pricing constituted the misappropriation. This conclusion belies the
fact that there was no evidence that Keil specifically told anyone at Brody what
the prices were and in fact the only evidence was that Keil sent letters to his
former customers telling each of them that he would beat WEST'S prices by
10%.
The Trial Courts ruling appears to be the ultimate example of judicial
creativity. After hearing argument by Defendants in essentially five (5)
different pre-trial, intra-trial and post-trial motions, the Trial Court, in an effort
to sustain the jury's verdict and the Court's own determination in the case,
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shifted its focus away from the three letters because it was clear the customers
were not given information, whether it was a Trade Secret or not, that they
didn't already know. The Trial Court effectively ruled, as a matter of law, that
the delivery by defendant Keil of letters to AUiant Tech, Mag Corp and Cargill
was not a misappropriation of Trade Secrets even though in its special verdict
form (Addendum B) the Court did not specifically require the jury to
determine the misappropriation of price quotes.
The problem with this analysis is the only evidence the jury heard was
the delivery of the three letters by Keil to the three companies. They heard no
evidence of what Keil actually gave to Brody or what Keil did with Brody or
what Brody knew. The Court, after having been asked to grant Summary
Judgment on this issue on four different occasions, finally, in its decision
denying Defendants' Motion for a New Trial ruled, as a matter of law, that
Keil's delivery of the price list to Brody was in fact the misappropriation and
not the delivery to WEST'S three customers. This theory was totally
unsupported by the evidence and was never argued by the WEST'S to the jury.
The Trial Court was given ample opportunity to implement this Court's
ruling in the Interlocutory Appeal. In the absence of specific evidence of price
lists and the distribution of them to individuals who did not know the prices,
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there was simply not a misappropriation of a Trade Secret. In fact, whether or
not a Trade Secret existed was not established by WEST.
Finally, as further affirmation that the Utah Trade Secrets Act does not
trump Muna, the Court is directed to the case of Envirotech Corp. vs.
Callahan. 872 P. 2d 487 (Utah App 1994), a case that does indeed follow the
legislative pronouncement of the Utah Trade Secrets Act. The opinion in that
case refers liberally to the provisions of Muna and cites them with approbation.
What is important in that case is that although the Court found there was a
Trade Secret and that it had been misappropriated, it continued to cite Muna
even after the enactment of the Utah Trade Secrets Act, as the controlling case
in Utah. Thus both Envirotech and this Court's ruling in the Interlocutory
Appeal specifically validated Muna. For the Trial Court to suggest that
somehow the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act changed the playing field from
Muna as a matter of law, is incorrect. Clearly applying Muna, the Trial Court
should have found in the pre-trial motions or at least after the presentation of
WEST'S case that there was no Trade Secret or, if it was, it had not been
misappropriated. The Court's failure to do so constituted error and abuse of
discretion and should be reversed.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT PURPONDERATE AT TRIAL
THAT THERE WAS A NEXUS BETWEEN THE ANY
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ACTIVITY OF KEIL WITH CUSTOMERS OF WEST
WHICH CAUSED DAMAGE TO WEST AND THE COURT
FURTHER COMPOUNDED THE JURY ERROR BY
FAILING BY FAILING EITHER TO DIRECT OR SET
ASIDE THE VERDICT.

The errors determined in Point I above pale in comparison to the failures
of the Jury and the Trial Court to properly consider the issue of the alleged
interference by the Defendants with economic relationships of WEST. The
marshalling of all the evidence supporting Plaintiffs claim, revokes problems
for WEST and the Trial Court.
WEST's claim that Keil intentionally interfered with the economic
relationships causing damages was limited to three customers Cargill, Mag
Corp and Allaint Tech. The Trial Court determined, after the presentation of
WEST'S case, that that there was no malicious, intentional interference, if at all,
by Keil through Brody with WEST'S relationship with the three customers at
issue. The only interference was the transmission of the Trade Secret, if in fact
it was a Trade Secret. ( See the Trial Court's ruling in the Motion for a Directed
Verdict.[Tp 290-93] Because the Trial Court specifically found that there wsa
no malicious type interference, this ruling obviates any reliance upon Leigh
Furniture and Carpet vs. Isom Supra. While this case deals with the tort of
interference with a prospective business relationship, its discussion does deal
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with the damage question or the question of economic interference in this case.
What the Trial Court essentially said is that by Keil sending letters to Mag
Corp, Alliant Tech and Cargill telling these people that he could beat WEST'S
prices, he potentially interfered with WEST'S economic relations with its
customers.
The problem with this theory is that in marshaling all of the evidence pro
and con, in this case, between what Keil did on behalf of himself and Brody
and any damage WEST asserts. WEST failed to show that its loss of business
was connected to Keil making an offer on behalf of Brody to the three
customers. In fact, while Mr. Leaver testified that WEST had long term
contracts with each of these three entities, he also acknowledged that nothing
in the contracts prohibited these customers from purchasing products and
services from someone else.[Tp. 22] In addition, all three of the
representatives of the entities in question, Keith Rydalch, Bruce Henderson,
and Kathleen Vigil testified that while price was one factor that always had to
be considered, it was not the most important factor. They all agreed that the
quality of service and products and the relationship with the service personnel
were much more important than price alone. In fact, Mag Corp did not use the
products and services of Brody and left WEST for other reasons as set forth in
their own letter. [See Ex 20] Cargill in fact did do business with Brody until
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November of 1999, and Alliant Tech did only 60 days worth of business with
Brody.
What is even more compelling in this discussion is that the President of
WEST-California, Brent William Chettle, called by WEST testified that there
were no price sheets for WEST products, but that prices were established as a
product of negotiation. [Tp 268] Specifically, he indicated that the primary
considerations with respect to competition in the industry for products and
services were the quality of the products and the quality of service. He stated
that, "Pricing I feel is secondary, it's an important factor to many customers,
but in some cases if the pricing becomes such an important consideration it
tends to impact upon the quality that can be delivered to those particular
clients. So, while it may be important to some companies, pricing to us
(meaning WEST) is not nearly that critical." [Tp 267]. Therefore, according to
Plaintiffs own witness although pricing is important, it is not critical and none
of the three claimed entities to whom WEST tied its damages indicated that the
pricing suggested by Keil in his letters made the difference in their decisions
either to leave WEST or go with Brody. Without the nexus between the price
and either the lost client or the benefit, there is no tortious interference with
prospective business relationships and, therefore, there is no damage.
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A thorough review of the evidence in this case shows that WEST did
not meet its burden either to the jury or to the Trial Court in various motions, to
demonstrate the appropriate measure of damages was. While there is not a
specific reference to the measure of damages in a Trade Secrets case in this
jurisdiction, this Court is directed to the following cases from other
jurisdictions, all of which wrestle with the problem of damages in Trade Secret
cases. The earliest case is International Industries vs. Warm Petroleum 248 F
2.d 696 (1957 ). This case arose from the United States District Court in
Delaware. In that case, the Court makes the following statement
the appropriate measure of damages in analyzing this to a
patent infringement is not what plaintiff lost but rather the
benefit, profits or advantage gained by the defendant in the use of
the Trade Secret Id. at 699.

More recently, in the case of Universal Computing Company vs, Lykes
Youngstown Corporation , 504 F 2.d 518 (1974) the Court, in dealing with a
misappropriation of the computer system, relied on the International Industry
case and cited with approval this language,
Certain standards do emerge from the cases. The defendant
must have actually put the Trade Secrets to some commercial use.
The law protecting Trade Secrets is essentially designed to
regulate unfair business competition. If the defendant enjoyed
actual profits a type of restitutionary remedy can be afforded the
Plaintiff, either recovering the full total of the defendants profits
or some proportional amount designed to correspond to the actual
contribution of the plaintiffs success. Because the primary
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concern in most cases is to measure the value to the defendant of
what he actually obtained from the plaintiff, the proper measure is
to calculate what the parties would have agreed to as a fair price
for licensing the defendant to put the Trade Secret to use. Id. at
539
The focus, therefore, should be on the benefit to the Defendants not what
WEST purportedly lost. Using this theory, the Defendants' sales to Alliant
Tech were $27, 724.00 and to Cargill were $10,960.00. 60% of those figures,
(the percentage WEST used to measure profit) totals $16,634.40 and the
$6,576.00 respectively.
WEST'S reliance upon the fact it lost essentially a years worth of
business based upon previous years earnings was improper. In this case
WEST'S damages were based upon a percentage of the profits from previous
year's contracts and the expectation that its service and products would be
supplied in a like manner for the next year. While this may be a reasonable
assumption, it was refuted by all three of the customers who indicated that
these were not adhesion or exclusive contracts and they were free to purchase
other products and services at any time. In fact, Mag Corp did just that. Prior
to Keil leaving WEST, Mag Corp. became dissatisfied with WEST'S boiler
products.
No evidence was presented of a reasonable likelihood that decisions
made by the two companies who did go with Brody (Cargill and Alliant Tech)
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were based upon price. As price was the only Trade Secret purportedly
misappropriated, damages can not flow unless there is a specific nexus between
the tw o. None was prov en b\ WEST.
The entirety of the WEST'S testimony with respect to damages came
from Mr. Lever, the local president of WEST. Trial Ex. 29 (which was later
amended when the Trial Court struck all but Alliant Tech, Mag Corp and
Cargill as the three customers directly related to this action) was prepared by
Mr. Leaver showing the basis for damages. Mr. Leaver testified that Keil had
sought out and developed agreements wL' J. 'V*-.* •/wpa:: 1 ^ A •':; r WEST.
Lever testified that there was an expectation that WEST u .1 T 4 , r;

: to

service these clients through 1998 and 1999.[Tp. 42-44 and 54] Ex. 22, 23 and
24 were introduced to show the ledger sheets of Alliant Tech, Cargill and
Magcorp, respectively. Mr. Leaver testified that these represented the services
and products utilized by each of these three companies in 1997.
With respect to Alliant I ech, Mi I ,eav ei testified that in February of
1998, he h.-vi received a two year purchase order a nd based upoi 1 that order and
previous sales, the anticipated gross sales for the two year period( 1998-1999)
would be $136,419.48. The gross profit margin was 60% thus the damage
figure of $81,851.69 as referenced on Exhibit 29. With respect to MagCorp,
Mr. Leaver testified similarly, WEST'S anticipated gross sales of $167,417.25
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at a 63% profit margin resulting in damages of $105,472.87. The same
expectation existed for Cargil based upon previous contracts. Results in
damages of $6,391.62, Ex. 29.
It is important to note, however, that in the same testimony, Mr. Leaver
also said that none of the purchase orders or the contracts WEST had with the
three companies were exclusive agreements. That is to say, they did not bind
these companies to purchasing certain products at a certain rate for a certain
period of time. The following colloquy between Counsel for Brody and Mr.
Leaver is critical:
"Question: That figure is based on an assumption on your part that
Alliant Tech was going to continue to deal with West?
Answer: I don't believe that's an assumption. I had an example, and
exhibit here as well as a two year purchase order they'd just given us in
February of 1998.
Question: But that didn't bind Alliant Tech to buy exclusively from
WEST, did it?
Answer: No, but the previous experience is they bought exclusively from
WEST.
Question: But the answer is no.
Answer: Answer no to what.
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Question: That it was, it did not prevent them from buying from
someone else.
Ansv ei : Ofr iously that's tn le.
Question: This is not a contract where they agree in writing to buy only
from you. Answer: That is correct.
Question: And if they got a better price from someone else, there was
nothing to prohibit them from buying the product if they felt it would do the
job for them at a better pi: Ice.
Ai iswer: That's correct ,f [Tp. 71 -72]
The same discussion took place with respect to Mag Corp and Cargill.
Even with respect to the damage claim for Keil's salary, a question was asked
in terms of the formulation in arriving at the $25,000 figure, (Ex. 29)
"Question: Is there any kind of a formula that you used in order to do that, or
was it a seat of the pants calculation?
Ai.

•.
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•
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• . . . * " v- •

commissions, because he made sales which the company profited from, and we
had taken off the taxes and they were related to the commission.
Question: So that was just an arbitrary determination on your part as to
how you'd handle that, is that a fair statement.
Answer: That's a fai r statement." [ I P 14 ]
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In essence, then WEST's damage claim fails in three respects: First there
is no nexus between what Keil did and the failure of Alliant Tech, Mag Corp
and Cargill to continue to purchase products from WEST. Second, there was
no binding contractual agreement for any of these customers to continue to
purchase products at a certain rate from WEST for any finite period of time.
Third, the damage amounts are totally speculative in that they are based on
prior purchase orders with no guarantee of future business.
Finally, and most importantly and as supported by the cases hereinbefore
cited, there was no evidence that Brody or Keil profited from any of the
transactions with these parties except to the extent of gross sales of $27,724 to
Alliant Tech and $10,960 to Cargill. This information was set forth in Plaintiffs
Exhibit F and G appended to Defendants' memorandums supporting Motion for
a New Trial, R. 1994 at 2015 and 2017. At the very least, if WESTs pricing
was a Trade Secret, and if it was misappropriated, and if it was delivered to
someone who didn't know WEST'S prices and all of those things were
concluded by a preponderance of the evidence, under the cases cited above, the
only damages WEST is entitled to is 60% of $27,724 + $10,960 or $23,210.
Defendants firmly believe that the jury believed Keil's relationship with
Brody, prior to his termination with WEST was inappropriate. The evidence
presented by WEST's demonstrated that five months before Keil terminated his
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employment with WEST Keil entered into discussions with representatives of
Brody conceniing possible employmenl

Keil was weighing whether or not he

could profitably change jobs and therefore, inquired ah ail the ability of Brody
to provide products of a similar quality to WEST'S products at competitive
prices so that Keil could continue to make the type of living he was
accustomed to working for WEST. [Tp. 319-320]
Keil testified tt lat in October of 1997, Jim Wilson, the sales manager of
Brody, contacted hi m ai id discussions ensued about Keil's interest in going to
work with Brody. Tp. 316. Keil, testified thai at the time he was not
particularly interested in leaving WEST, but if the proposition was attractive
enough he would consider it. [Tp 319] He also had conversations with Jon
Liddiard, the President of Brody, and was offered commissions and stock in the
company as part of a potential employment package. While there was not an
actual agreement reached, there v\ ere ongoing discussions, [1 p 321 322.] Keil
also admitted that, consistent with Jim Wilsoi i's trial testimony, between
October of 1997 and February of 1998, he became involved with a company
known as Buckman Laboratories, who was assisting Brody with their product
line. Keil contacted Buckman to determine whether it could provide products
to enhance Brody's product line and be competitive with WEST [Tp 323.] He
acknowledged that talking with Buckman was prepatory to making a
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commitment to Brody. [Tp 324] Keil then began discussions of his potential
move with Greg Offerman who also worked with WEST and the two of them
met with Jon Liddiard in early January of 1998, to discuss the fact that Keil had
been assured by Buckman that Brody could compete with WEST'S products
and at that point pricing became an issue [Tp 326] At that time neither Keil or
Offerman were employees of Brody and were still employees of WEST.
After Keil initially reviewed Brody's price list he determined that
Brody's prices were not competitive with WEST. Keil advised Mr. Liddiard
that he was not inclined to leave WEST. Mr. Liddiard responded by advising
Keil that he would have more flexibility in determining prices and with that,
Keil determined that he would make the move from WEST to Brody. [Tp. 328329] Keil acknowledged that he did not leave in February, and waited until
early March because he did not want to notify existing customers that he was
leaving WEST and that he could sell competitive products at comparable prices
for his new company, until he was actually terminated from WEST. [Tp 329]
He did, however, prepare a letter, on his own computer, dated February 18,
1998 to Cargill Flour on Brody Chemical stationery, [Exhibit 11 in the Trial],
in which Cargill was advised that he, Keil, was moving to Brody and discussed
prices and products. Keil testified, however, that although the date of the
Exhibit was February 18th it was not delivered until after Keil left WEST. It
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was delivered directly to Mr. Henderson on ui about the 9 ' or 10 ]l of Mai eh
[Tp 33 1. | Tins was corroborated by Henderson's testimony in the Trial
proceedings. [Tp 184]
There is no doubt in Defendants' mind, however, that the jury believed,
as did the Trial Judge, that Keil and Brody's conduct in the months between
October of 1997 and March 5, 1998 were inappropriate in some way. T u jury
was notinstructec w. ,:,c ;.:o • ; ^

JAVS

or .ho-. .vrraer- or di-cus^i-•?> were

improper, Defendants believe that this poisoned the well with respect to both
the Courts and the jury's analysis of whether some liability should attach to the
Defendants for WEST'S loss of the three customers, Cargill, Alliant Tech and
Mag Corp.
Plaintiff could have cured this entire problem by utilizing a non-compete
agreement. Plaintiff knew it, tl le Defendants knew it, the jury and the J udge
knew it

=:obviously, the Trial j •. urt failed to consider its importance. There

are many business situations in which employers, who hire potentially valuable
employees to develop customers and business, require, as part of initial
employment, that employees sign what is known throughout the trade as a noncompetition agreement. These agreements limit the kinds of activities
employees can not engage in \ \ they leav e ei i lployment. These agreements
traditionally ' In nit ti le abil ity of the employee to compete with the former

39

company, by type of activity, area, and length of time. As Mr. Leaver testified
in this case, no such agreement was ever made between Keil and WEST. A
non-competition agreement could have protected WEST against precisely what
Keil in this case. Keil helped to develop WEST'S business by the sheer force
of his personality, dedication and technical expertise thereby ingratiating
himself with certain customers. He then attempting to take those customers
with him when he left WEST'S employment. A non-competition agreement
would have solved WEST'S problem.
WEST forfeited the most effective remedy it had to prevent what
happened here, and then spent the entirety of the litigation process trying to
make a round peg fit into a square hole by claiming misappropriation of Trade
Secrets and interference with economic relationships to obtain damages from
the Defendants. The analysis of evidence had to be tortured by both the jury
and the Trial Judge to arrive at the result which is contrary to the law, contrary
to the evidence, and contrary to standard business practices.
CONCLUSION
This Court, after sending a clear signal in its Interlocutory Appeal
Decision as to the limitations of WEST'S causes of action, should not now
allow its initial decision to be weakened by what happened in the Trial in this
case.

What is even more compelling is that, notwithstanding the jury's
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inability to apply the facts to the law, the Trial Court Judge was given ample
opportunity both prior Lo during and post-trial to resolve these issues in an
appropriate manner He chose not to do M\ fuilher eompvunding the error.
This Court should now complete the work it began,,,, i n the Interlocutory
Appeal by ruling, as a matter of law, that WEST'S pricing was not a Trade
Secret, that the sending of letters by Keil to existing customers, who already
knew WEST'S prices was not an misappropriation of a Trade Secret and that
there is no nexus betweei 1 what Defendai:* - c,
suffered b} - W EST with respect to the *:v - •

. Mis case to any damage
* ';;vr- r^iia.,}::^ .

litigation. Notwithstanding the above, if there was damage

,;e
leasure

thereof should be based upon the gain received by Brody not any purported
loss by WEST.
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should reverse the decision of
tlle I rial Court and enter a judgment of no cause of action or, in the alternative,
to •-' -- "• reduce WESTs judgment to $23,210.40.
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Water & Energy Systems
Technology, Inc.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
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Steven L. Keil,
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February 19, 1999

Second District Court, Farmington Dep't
The Honorable Rodney S. Page
Attorneys:

Joseph C. Rust, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Thomas R. Blonquist, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice:
11
We granted appellant Steven Keil's petition for an
interlocutory appeal from the district court's grant of a
preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiff Water & Energy
Systems Technology, Inc. ("WEST").
12
For approximately twelve years prior to March 2, 1998,
>Keil worked for WEST as a water treatment chemical salesman.
Keil voluntarily terminated his employment with WEST on March 2,
1998, and accepted a similar sales position with one of WEST'S
competitors, Brody Chemical ("Brody"). Keil did not have an
employment contract with WEST nor did he sign a covenant not to
compete with WEST should he terminate his employment with them.
In the month prior to leaving WEST, Keil made several service
calls for Brody and researched the availability of chemical
ingredients for some of Brody's products. Keil also had meetings
with Brody to discuss the viability of Brody's plans to increase
its presence in the water treatment chemical business. During
fchose meetings, Brody assured Keil that Brody's products could
compete with WEST'S.

'

13
While working for WEST, Keil had access to the formulae
and prices for WEST'S water treatment chemicals. During his
employment, Keil derived most of his commissions from sales of
water treatment chemicals to Hill Air Force Base, Alliant
Technologies, Laidlaw, Magnesium Corporation, Utah State
University and E. G. & G. Immediately after leaving WEST'S
employ, Keil contacted the above clients to solicit their
business for Brody, claiming that Brody's products were "very
similar" to WEST'S.
14
On March 9, 1998, WEST filed a complaint against Keil
in district court alleging misappropriation of trade secrets.
WEST claimed that Keil had misappropriated WEST'S formulae and
prices for its water treatment chemicals and supplied them to
Brody, thereby giving Brody and Keil an unfair competitive
advantage over WEST. At the time it filed the complaint, WEST
also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Keil
from contacting the six major clients he had while working for
WEST and to prohibit Keil from disclosing to Brody any
confidential information obtained from WEST. The district court
heard and granted WEST'S motion for preliminary injunction. Keil
then filed a motion for relief from the preliminary injunction
and for a new trial. The district court heard and denied Keil's
motion. Keil then filed a petition seeking permission to file an
interlocutory appeal from the district court's grant of the
preliminary injunction. That petition was granted.
15
In this appeal, Keil asserts that the district court
erred in granting WEST'S motion for a preliminary injunction
because WEST failed to meet its burden of showing that (1) WEST
would suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction issued,
(2) the injury to WEST substantially outweighs the damage the
injunction would cause Keil, and (3) WEST is likely to succeed on
the merits of the underlying action.
16
We will not disturb a district court's grant of a
preliminary injunction unless the district court abused its
discretion or rendered a decision against the clear weight of the
evidence. See Kasco Services Corp, v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 90
(Utah 1992) (citing Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d
421, 425 (Utah 1983)) .
17
Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets
forth the elements that must be present before a preliminary
injunction may issue:
(1) The applicant will suffer
irreparable harm unless the order or
injunction issues;
vr^
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business, formulae and prices are usually proprietary and held
confidential.
511 However, WEST failed to establish that Keil copied
its prices or its products and supplied them to Brody. At the
hearing, Keil introduced copies of Brody's formulae and Keil's
best recollection of WEST'S chemical formulae. The formulae are
not identical. Furthermore, Keil's expert testified that
although the formulae are somewhat similar, there are significant
differences between Brody's and WEST'S formulae. Loretitsch
explained that Brody's formulae differ from WEST'S in three ways.
First, the individual ingredients in the formulae are different
chemicals. Second, the percentages of the individual chemicals
present in each formula are different. Finally, the ratios of
the individual components with respect to each other in Brody's
formulae are not the same as in WEST'S
The expert then opined
that Brody's formulae are not copied from WEST'S. He then
accounted for the similarities between WEST and Brody formulae by
explaining that to some extent all the chemical formulations in
this industry are driven by market and regulatory forces.
212 In contrast, WEST neither submitted its formulae
to the trial court nor did it supply a price sheet. The court
was forced to rely on Keil's best guess as to WEST'S formulae and
WEST'S representation that the prices were the same. WEST did
not introduce any expert testimony regarding whether Brody's
formulae had in fact been copied from WEST. WEST relied on the
self-serving statements of its president, Frank Leaver, who
stated that Brody sold "almost duplicate products" after Keil
began working for them. Notably, however, Leaver did not testify
that Brody's formulae were copies of WEST'S.
113 In addition to his expert's testimony, Keil
introduced evidence illustrating that the water treatment
chemical industry is relatively easy to break into. Several
industry publications set forth suggested general chemical makeups for water treatment chemicals. Both Keil and Brody president
John Liddiard described how Brody arrived at the formulations for
its products through consultation with Buckman Laboratories and
affirmed that it did not copy its formulae from WEST.
514 Finally, the district court's own findings support
our conclusion that the injunction was improperly granted. The
court's findings indicate that it believed WEST'S formulae,
although not exact duplicates, were uvery similar" to Brody's.
Similarities which can be explained by industry or regulatory
cTemands cannot suffice to meet the requirement that Brody copied
WEST'S confidential formulae, especially in light of the abundant
testimony that the formulae were not copied and the substantial
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(2) The threshold injury to the
applicant outweighs whatever damage the
proposed order or injunction may cause the
party restrained or enjoined.
(3) The order or injunction, if issued,
would not be adverse to the public interest;
and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood
that the applicant will prevail on the merits
of the underlying claim, or the case presents
serious issues on the merits which should be
the subject of further litigation.
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e) (1998). Because we are persuaded that
WEST failed to meet its burden under subsection four above, we
reverse the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction.
58
To meet the requirements of subsection four, an
applicant must, at the very least, make a prima facie showing
that the elements of its underlying claim can be proved. See
Utah State Road Common v. Fribera, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984)
(suggesting that prima facie showing of the elements of the
underlying claim is required for issuance of preliminary
injunction) ; see also Schwalm Elecs. Inc. v. Electrical Prods.
Corp., 302 N.E.2d 394, 397 (111. App. Ct. 1973) (stating prima
facie case of misappropriation of trade secrets is necessary to
support issuance of an injunction); Paramount Office Supply Co.
v. D. A. Maclsaac, Inc. 524 A.2d 1099, 1101 (R.I. 1987)
(requiring prima facie evidence of misappropriation of customer
list prior to ordering injunction).
19
To establish a claim for misappropriation of trade
secrets, WEST must show (1) the existence of a trade secret,
(2) communication of the trade secret to Keil under an express or
implied agreement limiting disclosure of the secret, and
(3) Keil's use of the secret that injures WEST. See
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98
(Utah 1981) . "An employer to obtain relief must establish that
his former employee's product is a copy of his own product." Id.
at 696 (emphasis added).
510 Arguably, WEST established that its prices and
formulae for its water treatment chemicals were secret and that
it had an implied agreement with Keil limiting disclosure of the
prices and formulae. In fact, even Keil's expert, Gary
Loretitsch, testified that in the water treatment chemical

3
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amount of information in the public domain regarding water
treatment chemicals. WEST had the burden of producing evidence
that would establish that its formulae were in fact stolen by
Keil for use by Brody. It is hard to see how this burden could
possibly have been met when WEST never submitted actual formulae
to the trial court for comparison purposes.
115 In light of the foregoing, we find that the
district court's grant of the preliminary injunction was against
the clear weight of the evidence. WEST did not meet its burden
of establishing a prima facie case that Keil copied confidential
information and supplied that information to Brody.
Consequently, we reverse the district court's grant of a
preliminary injunction.

Chief Justice Howe, Justice Stewart, Justice Zimmerman,
and Justice Russon concur in Associate Chief Justice Durham's
opinion.
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ADDENDUM B

FILED
MAY - 5 2000

JOSEPH C. RUST (2835)
KESLER & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-8000
Attorneys for Plaintiff

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEVEN L. KEIL; and BRODY CHEMICAL
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

:

JUDGMENT

:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 980700090CV
Judge Rodney S. Page

:

This case having come on for jury trial before the Honorable Rodney S. Page beginning on
March 1,2000 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. and continuing through to March 3,2000, and Defendants'
Motion for Direct Verdict having been denied, and the jury having heard the evidence and the
arguments of counsel and having been instructed on the law by the Court, and the jury having
returned its verdict as follows:
1.

Were the customer price quotes a trade secret? Yes.

2.

Did Steven Keil misappropriate the price quotes?

Yes
JUDGMENT ENTERED

3.

Did Steven Keil intentionally interfere with a prospective economic relationship of

Plaintiff with Alliant and/or MagCorp., and/or Cargill? Yes.
4.

Did the actions of Steven Keil result in damage to the Plaintiff? Yes.

5.

Was Steven Keil acting as an agent for Brody Chemical when he misappropriated the

price quotes and contacted Plaintiffs consumers? Yes.
6.

The amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of Defendant KeiFs

actions: lost profits -$190,000, unearned salary and benefits paid-$4,706.
7.

Does Plaintiff owe any sums to Mr. Keil for commissions, unpaid salary or expenses?

8.

The amount Plaintiff owes Defendant Keil- $4231.00 for commissions; $300.00 for

Yes.

expenses, and $1500.00 for salary, for a total of $6,031.00.
NOW, THEREFORE it is HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
Plaintiff Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. is awarded judgment against Defendants,
jointly and severally, in the amount of $188,675.00 together with Plaintiffs costs.
DATED this M-K day of May. 2000.

BY THE COURT:

P
HONORABLE RODNEYSPAGE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM C

BR«DY
CHEMICAL
+Z25 SQM± 6200 Wesc
P.O. Bo.x 18747
Szlz Late City. Uzzh 84118-0747
OFFICE: (801) 963-2436 FAX: (80L) 963-2437

March 3, 1998
Mr. Keith Rydslch
Magnesium Corporation of America
Rcwiey, Utah
Dear Keith,
I have enjoyed our relationship dur~.g t h e t i m e I served you as a representative of
W.E.S.T., inc. ! have made a change, arse I n o w represent Brcdy Chemical
I have made this change for many rezszes. A number of these are beneficial to you, ! can
n e w provide you greaser support resources and a substantially lower cost for the technical
service and the wster treatment products. T n e additional lattrajde and support I now enjoy
will enhance the (eve! of service f can provide you.
T n e water treatment products that I will supply -are. essentially the same as those I have
supplied in t h e pasr, and that have provided you wkh excellent resufts. However, these
products will now come WTLH three s:gnmcant advantages: "first, the cooling tower inhibitor
wii! have an increased amount of mofybdate, b u t a d^creassd amount of phosphate t o
eliminate caJcum phosphate deposition without sacrifidng corrosion protection; • second,
Iogisrics wiii b e Improved * because the manufacturing and warehousing feclices a r e in Sait
Lake Ozy; and, third, the cost will be subszaniiaify lower beczjjse. of the lower product
cost, and the lower-freight: cost
Over t h e years I have ser^d you, i have developed an extensive knowledge of your
systems and operations. ! have also developed a good working relationship with your
personnel. My connnueing cbjec±ve wii! be t o provide you superior protection for your
systems by applying optimal treatment products, state of the an controf and application
methods, and competent and dedicated technical service. Kehh, I value your business
highly, and I look forward to continuing our relationship and t o serving you in the, -future.

Sincerely,

I

^ t e v e Keil

|a

PLAINTIFFS
1?

• SALT L A X C CITY. UTAH - LOS A.NGHLE5. CALIFORNIA - DH.WEX COLORADO • S A N Dl£CO, CALIFORNIA - BOlSc. IDAHO - SA> FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA - PHOENTX ARIZONA •

BR#DY
CHEMICAL

—'825 South 6200 West
.0, Box 18747
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-0747
OFFICE. (801) 963-2436 FAX. (801) 963-2437

March 3, 1998
Ms. Kathy Vigil
AJliant Techsystems.lnc.
P.O. Box 98
Magna, Utah 84044
Dear Kathy,
I have enjoyed our relationship during the time I have served you as a representative
of W.E.S.T., Inc. I have made a change, and I now represent Brody Chemical.
1 have made this change for many reasons. A number of these are beneficial to you.
I can now provide you greater support resources and a substantially lower cost for
the technical service and the water treatment products. The additional lattrtude and
support I now enjoy will enhance the level of service I can provide you.
The water treatment products that I will supply are essentially the same as those I
have supplied in the past, and that have provided you with remarkable results.
However, these products will now come with two'significant advantages: first,
logistics will be improved because the manufacturing and warehousing facilities are
in Salt Lake Crty, and, second, the cost will be substantially lower because of the
lower product cost, and the lower freight cost.
The following is a list of the W.E.S.T. products I have utilized in treating your systems
and the pricing, and the corresponding Brody Chemical products and. pricing. The
effectiveness and use rates will be essentially the same, so you can see thac the
savings will be substantial. The freight savings will provide an additional cost reduction
of $0.06 to $0.12 per pound. In total the cost reduction will be more than
$10,000.00 per year.
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

1SL

WEST
PRODUCT

WEST PRICING

BRODY PRICING

per pound

BRODY
PRODUCT

B-206

$1.22

BI07

$U0

B-4II

$1.65

B557

$1.50

B-501

$0.73

B600

$0.68

C-365

$1.48

CTI07

$1.20

per pound

Please keep this information confidential.
Over the years I nave served you, I have developed an extensive knowledge of your
systems and operations. I have also developed a good working relationship with
your personnel. As in the past, my objective will be to provide you superior
protection for your systems by applying optimal treatment products, state of the art
control and application methods, and competent and dedicated technical service.
Kathy, I value your business highly, and I look forward to continuing our relationship
and to serving you in the future.

Sincerely,

Steve Keil

Brace Sddariuii

Rour Ming

CHEMICAL
^ 5 South. 6200 West
. Box 18747
sic Lake City. Utah. 84-118-0747
FFICH: (8013 963-2436 FAX: (8QI) S63-2A37

Q CAKIUFOODS

27SQGATO".CB

OjSea.CT 84402
FxEMlyaS4-7a3fi

Tat aax^S2i-3S4a Er. u&

March 3, 1953
Mr. Bruce Henderson
Cargill Rcur Miffing
2780 G Avenue
O£}en T Uteh8440l
Dear Bruce,
I hsve enjoyed our relationship during me time i servea you as a representative of
W.E.S.T., Inc. I have made a change, and ! new represent Ercdy Chemical,
I have made this changefermany reasons/ A number of these-are" beneficial to you.
I can now provide ycu greater support resources and a substantially lower-cost fer
the technics service and the water fresanent products. The additional-[attitude and
support I now enjoy will enhance the leveJ. of service I can provide you.
The water treatment products that 1 will supply are essentially the same as those 1
have supplied in the past, and that have provided' you with remarkable results,However, these products wffl-now come with''two..-significant advantages: first,
logistics will be improved because the manufacturing and-warehc^jsing-1sdffes-ang.
in Safe Lake Oty, and, second, the cost will be substantially lower, because of the
tower product cost, and .the Sower frei^rt cost
The following is a list of the WEST, products 1 have-L^Tized in'treating your systems,
and -the pricing, and the corresponding Brccy Chemical products and pricing.- The
effectiveness -and use ratss will -be essentially the same, so you -can see that the
savings will be substantia'. The freight saving will provide an additional cost reduction
of $0.12 to $0.16 per pound. In total the cost reduction will be mere than twenty
I.

1
•

SALT LAKH

crrr. LTAK • 10s

EXHIBIT

ia

• D£.vvs3L COLORADO - SAN DIECO, CALIFORNIA - aocsE. IDAHO «•
• SAN F2JLXGSC3 CALIFORNIA • PHOENIX ARIZONA •

ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

WEST
PRODUCT

WEST PRICING

BRODY PRICING

per pound

BRODY
PRODUCT

B-206

$1.45

B107

$130

B-402

$!.£0

BS*0

$1.50

&-503

$0.73

B600

$3.68

C-516

$1.45

CTI07

$1.25

per pound

Please keep this information confictential.
O^erthe years I have served you, I have developed-an-extensive knowledge-of your
systems and operations, f have also developed-a gocd..woridng relationship with'
your personnel. As in the past, my objective will be to provide you superior
protection for your systems by applying optimal treatment products, state of the art
control and application-methods, and competent and dedicated technical service.
Bruce, 1 value your business hi^riy, and I- look forward-to continuing our relattonshipand to serving you in the future..
Sincereiy,

Steve Keif

ADDENDUM D

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY, INC , A Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs),

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
Case No. 980700090
STEVEN L. KETL and BRODY
CHEMICAL, A Utah corporation,
Defendant(s).

Comes now the Court and having reviewed Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
and their Memorandum submitted in support thereof and Plaintiffs Memorandum and Affidavit
submitted in opposition thereto and having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully
advised in the premises hereby rules as follows:
The Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could
conclude that the formula and price list of Plaintiff were confidential and Defendant Keil was
under an express or implied contract which limited their disclosure. However, in order for the
Plaintiff to prevail on their claim of misappropriation of Plaintiff s formula, Plaintiff has to prove
that the formulas were the same or that Brody's formulas were specifically derived from those of
the Plaintiff.

No such credible evidence has been provided either by testimony at the prior hearing or
by subsequent affidavit. For that reason, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the issue of the misappropriation of the formulae.
The Court further concludes that there remains a question of fact as to the
misappropriation of Plaintiffs price list and as to whether Plaintiffs price lists were used by
Defendant Keil and Brody in establishing their own price lists. Therefore, the Court hereby
denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of misappropriation of the price
lists and causes of action for interference with economic relationships and violation of the Trade
Secrets Act.
Defendant's counsel is to prepare Judgment in accordance with the Court's Ruling and
submit the same to opposing counsel at least 5 days prior to the time it is submitted to the Court
for signature.
Dated this Z&< day of July, 1999.
By the Court:

ADDENDUM E

DEC 1 fi B 9 9

JOSEPH C. RUST (2835)
KESLER & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-8000
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEVEN L. KEIL; and BRODY CHEMICAL
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

:

ORDER ON MOTIONS

:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 980700090CV
Judge Rodney S. Page

:

Defendant Brody Chemical's Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment Out
of Time, Brody's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Keil's Motion for Summary Judgment,
and Plaintiff WEST'S two Motions to Compel having all come on for hearing before the Honorable
Rodney S. Page on the 30th day of November, 1999 at the hour of 10:30 a.m., and the Plaintiff being
represented by its counsel Joseph C. Rust, and Defendant Steven Keil being represented by his
counsel John Caine, and Defendant Brody being represented by its counsel Thomas R. Blonquist,

and the Court having reviewed the Memoranda submitted by counsel, other documents filed with
the Court, as well as the Court file, and having heard oral arguments,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendant Brody Chemical's Motion to File Motion for Summary Judgment Out of Time
is granted;

2.

Defendant Brody Chemical's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied on the basis that there
remain contested material issues of fact;

3.

Defendant Steven Keil's Motion for Summary Judge is denied on the basis that there remain
contested material issues of fact;

4.

Plaintiff WEST'S Motion to Compel information concerning Cargill and Union Pacific, and
specifically communications with and sales to, is hereby granted. Defendants are to supply
the information by December 30, 1999.

5.

The trial date is vacated and the new trial date is set for Wednesday, February 23, 1999.

6.

On Plaintiffs Trade Secrets Claims, Plaintiff will not be entitled to reference any customers
other than Mag Corp, EG & G, Union Pacific, Hill Air Force Base, Utah State University,
Cargill Flour, Laidlaw and Alliant TechSystems.

7.

Each of the parties is to immediately submit to each other copies of their price sheets which
they submitted in camera to the Court. Such documents will be held confidential by
opposing counsel, shall be available for review only by the parties and their respective
2

expert witnesses and counsel, and all copies shall be subject to continuing requirements of
confidentiality, namely, that such documents shall be held by the Coun and protected in
strict confidentiality, and returned to Plaintiff at the conclusion of trial.
DATED this 1 5 ^ day of December, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

SffiY S. PAGE
HONORABLE RODN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by the method indicated below a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTIONS, in Civil No. 980700090CV, postage prepaid, this
J p ^ d a y of December, 1999, to:

X

Thomas R. Blonquist
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

FEDERAL EXPRESS
U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERY
TELEFAX TRANSMISSION

John Caine
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
2568 Washington Blvd., #200
Ogden, Utah 84401

M^^/V
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ADDENDUM F

,nn,c T PaCT COU^
c-£C0HU

P fc *°
JOSEPH C. RUST (2835)
KESLER & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-8000
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah corporation,

UKJLULK

Plaintiff,
v.
STEVEN L. KEIL and BRODY CHEMICAL
INC., a Utah corporation.

Civil No. 980700090CV
Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendant.

Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion for a New Trial or
Amendment of Verdict, and Motion for Remittitur having come on for hearing before the Honorable
Judge Rodney S. Page, on the 2nd day of May. 2000, at the hour of 10:15 a.m., and Plaintiff being
represented by its counsel, Joseph C. Rust, Defendant Brody Chemical being represented by its
counsel, Thomas R. Blonquist, and Defendant Stephen L. Keil being represented by his counsel,

John T. Caine, and the Court having reviewed the Memoranda submitted by the parties and having
heard the arguments of counsel, the Court finds and rules as follows:
FINDINGS
1.

The misappropriation of confidential information by Defendants took place not in the

disclosure of Plaintiff s WEST pricing to its own customers but rather in the disclosure of WEST
pricing to Defendant Brody Chemical, an entity separate from Defendant Keil, for the purpose of
Brody Chemical to compete with WEST.
2.

By Defendant Keil giving that confidential information to Defendant Brody

Chemical, the trade secret was destroyed.
3.

The pricing information provided to Defendant Brody Chemical did not come from

Plaintiff WEST'S customers but rather directly from Defendant Keil.
4.

The damages awarded by the jury were fair and reasonable, and in keeping with the

evidence presented at trial.
5.

The case of Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982)

is relevant as to setting the standards by which the tort of interference with a business relationship
is determined.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendants' Motions and each of them are hereby denied.

2

^

2.

Plaintiffs costs in the amount of $1986.09 are approved, there having been no

objection to the same filed within five (5) days of May 2,2000.
DATED this 3\ ^

day of May, 2000.

BY THE COURT:

XJ - W
1*=ZHONORABLE JUDGE RODNEY S. PAGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by the method indicated below a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, in Civil No. 980700090CV, postage prepaid, this \$°^
day of May, 2000, to:

~2f£

Thomas R. Blonquist
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

FEDERAL EXPRESS
U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERY
TELEFAX TRANSMISSION

John Caine
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
2568 Washington Blvd., #200
Ogden, Utah 84401
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